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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the “no loss” argument raised in Marlborough District Council v 
Altimarloch. Assessing the conventional principles relevant to assessing loss in 
negligence, it suggests that no extension of the principles should be made to include a 
third party claim for damages in the calculation of loss. The principle in The Liverpool 
(No 2), and the principles of mitigation are also discussed.  
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I Introduction  
 
Consider a situation where C, through negligent misrepresentation, induces A to enter 
into a contract with B. B, the contracting party, has made materially the same 
representation to A. A sues both B and C concurrently. The claim against B is governed 
by the Contractual Remedies Act 1979, and the representation is treated as if it were a 
term of the contract. The claim against C is in negligence. The question then arises, can C 
be said to have caused A “loss” when the claim for damages against B is greater than the 
difference between the contract price and the value received, and there appears to be no 
doubt that B will pay? 
 
This was the question posed to the Supreme Court in Marlborough District Council v 
Altimarloch Joint Venture Limited.
1
 The question raised a conceptual difficulty. While it 
was almost certain that A would recover from B, at the time of judgment A had not done 
so. Could the Court take into account the fact that A would almost certainly recover from 
B? How would it do so? Tipping J and Elias CJ held that the likely recovery could be 
  
1 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012] 2 NZLR 726.  
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accounted for by valuing A’s claim for contractual damages and concluded that C had not 
caused A any loss. McGrath, Anderson and Blanchard JJ held that C had caused A loss. 
Four judges gave reasons for their decision and all followed different paths of reasoning.  
 
That the issue split the Supreme Court so fundamentally indicates that the issue warrants 
discussion. This essay will focus on the minority approach and asks how the approach fits 
within the existing legal framework. It will conclude that the minority approach fits 
awkwardly with the principles relevant to calculating loss in negligence, and the rule in 
The Liverpool (No 2)
2
. For this reason, the majority approach is preferred.  
 
 
II The case  
A The Facts  
 
The Altimarloch litigation followed from a sale and purchase agreement for a farm 
property in Marlborough. The purchaser, Altimarloch Joint Venture Limited 
(Altimarloch), intended to establish a vineyard on the property. Representations were 
made to Altimarloch by the vendor’s agents that certain water rights were available and 
would be transferred with the land. Prior to confirming the conditional agreement, 
Altimarloch obtained a Land Information Memorandum (LIM)3 from the Marlborough 
District Council (“the Council”) which confirmed that these water rights were available.  
 
The purchase price of the property was $2.675m. After settlement, Altimarloch 
discovered that only some of the represented water rights were available, the others 
having been transferred in a previous subdivision of the property. The value of the 
property without the water rights was $2.55m.  
 
  
2 Steamship Enterprises of Panama Inc, The “Liverpool” (Owners) v “Ousel” (Owners) [1963] P 64 (CA).  
3 A Land Information Memorandum is a report issued by a territorial authority in relation to a particular 
property. See the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, s 44A. 
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The result was a claim for damages by Altimarloch against the vendors based on 
misrepresentations made by their real estate agents and solicitors. Altimarloch also 
claimed damages against the Council for the alleged misrepresentations in the LIM.  
 
B The High Court  
 
In the High Court, Wild J found the vendors liable under s 6 of the Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979 (CRA). Section 6(1) provides that:4 
 
If a party to a contract has been induced to enter into it by a misrepresentation, whether 
innocent or fraudulent, made to him by or on behalf of another party to that contract –  
(a) He shall be entitled to damages from that other party in the same manner and 
to the same extent as if the representation were a term of the contract that has 
been broken.  
 
Altimarloch was entitled to a contractual measure of damages against the vendor. A sum 
of $1,055,907.16 was awarded, which represented the cost to Altimarloch of obtaining 
additional water rights, together with the cost of constructing a dam to remedy the 
shortfall.5  
 
Applying the tests in Rolls-Royce New Zealand Ltd v Carter Holt Harvey6 and Attorney-
General v Body Corporate 200200
7
 Wild J found that the Council owed Altimarloch a 
duty of care.8 This duty was breached by the error in identifying water rights in the LIM.9 
These errors were material in Altimarloch confirming the contract as unconditional.10 
  
4 Contractual Remedies Act 1979, s 6.  
5 Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd v Moorhouse (No 2) HC Blenheim CIV-2005-406-91, 23 March 2009 at 
[88] 
6 Rolls-Royce New Zealand Ltd v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd [2005] 1 NZLR 324 at [58]-[65].  
7 Attorney-General v Body Corporate 200200 [2007] 1 NZLR 95 at [35]-[37]  
8 Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd v Moorhouse HC Blenheim CIV-2005-406-91 3 July 2008  at [115]-[140].  
9 At [141].  
10At [142]. 
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Wild J held that the appropriate measure of damages against the Council was $400,000.11 
This represented the difference between the value of the property with the water rights as 
represented ($2.95m) and the value of the property as received ($2.55m).12  
 
C The Court of Appeal  
 
In the Court of Appeal, the liability of, and award of damages against, the vendors was 
upheld.13 The Court agreed with Wild J that the Council owed a duty of care in relation to 
the provision of the LIM.14  
 
On appeal, the Council put forward the novel argument that its negligence had not caused 
Altimarloch any loss.15 Under the agreement, Altimarloch had paid $2.675m. In return, it 
had received property worth $2.55m, but also had a claim for breach of a deemed 
statutory warranty against the vendors (under s 6 CRA), worth more than the difference 
between price paid and value.16 Although the rights acquired by Altimarloch were not the 
same as those which it had expected to obtain, because of the ability to claim against the 
vendor, they were of the same value, and worth distinctly more than the purchase price.17 
 
The Court of Appeal recorded that there was “considerable apparent force” in the 
Council’s argument, but held that Altimarloch had suffered loss as a result of entering 
into the transaction.18 Fundamentally, this was because the argument advanced by the 
Council was based on hindsight. Looking at the situation at the outset of the litigation, it 
  
11 Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd v Moorhouse, above n 8, at [235].  
12 At [235].  
13 Vining Realty Group Ltd v Moorhouse [2010] NZCA 104, (2011) 11 NZCPR 879.  
14 At [97].  
15 At [98]. 
16 At [98]. 
17 At [100]. 
18 At[100].  
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was not certain that Altimarloch would succeed in establishing liability against the 
vendor.19  
  
In the Court’s view, to accept the Council’s argument would require the Court to look to 
the claim against the vendor first, before considering the Council’s liability. The Court 
declined to adopt this approach, seeing “little intrinsic appeal in an approach which 
means that the MDC egg can insist the Moorhouse chicken comes first”.20 For reasons of 
common sense, and due to the causal significance of the LIM in leading to the contract 
becoming unconditional, the Court held that the Council’s negligence had caused 
Altimarloch loss.21  
 
The Court of Appeal disagreed that the quantum of the loss was $400,000; Wild J had 
come to this figure by applying a contractual measure of damages inappropriate for the 
Council’s liability in tort. The correct measure was the difference between the price paid 
for the property and the value of the property with the water rights as received; this 
amounted to $125,000.22 
 
D The Supreme Court  
1 “No Loss” 
 
In the Supreme Court the Council again argued that it had caused Altimarloch no loss.  
 
Tipping J and Elias CJ accepted this argument. For Tipping J, the issue could be resolved 
by applying conventional causation principles.23 The Council’s negligent LIM had 
induced the purchaser to confirm the contract as unconditional and prima facie, the 
purchaser had acquired something worth less than the price paid. However, it would be 
  
19 Vining Realty Group Ltd v Moorhouse, above n13, at [107].  
20 At [108]. 
21 At [108].  
22 At [113].  
23 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above, n 1, at [106].  
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artificial and contrary to authority to look only at the state of affairs at the time of the 
purchasers entry into the contract - the real question was whether the contract was 
ultimately a loss making one.24 In the present case Altimarloch had exercised its rights 
under the contract to claim damages against the vendor. This claim could be taken into 
account in assessing the net loss under the transaction.  
 
Like Tipping J, Elias CJ considered that the ultimate net position of the purchaser under 
the contract was determinative.25 All gains and advantages obtained through the 
transaction should be accounted for in determining the contractual position.26  
 
In the present case there was no doubt over the ability of the vendors to meet the 
judgment against them. As the amount of the judgment would be greater than the 
difference between the price paid for the property and its ultimate value, Tipping J and 
Elias CJ concluded that the Council had caused the purchaser no loss.  
 
The majority of the Supreme Court rejected the Council’s no loss argument. McGrath J 
(Anderson J concurring) applied ordinary principles of causation, and found that 
Altimarloch would not have confirmed the contract had the council’s LIM been correctly 
supplied.27 In such circumstances it would be artificial to treat the vendor’s 
misrepresentation as the sole cause of the loss.28 The Council was not entitled to have its 
liability for damages determined by taking into account Altimarloch’s claim against the 
vendors; on that basis, the loss for which the Council was liable was to be assessed at the 
time the contract was entered into.29  
 
Blanchard J agreed. The Council could not say that it had not caused Altimarloch loss 
until Altimarloch had actually received payment for an amount at least equal to the 
  
24 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd , above n 1, at [106].  
25 At [50].  
26 At [50]. 
27 At [207].  
28 At [207].  
29 At [204].  
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diminution in value of the land ($125,000).30 While the rights under the contract created 
an expectation that the purchaser would recover from the vendors, the existence of those 
rights and a judgment for their enforcement could not be equated to actual performance 
of the contract breaker’s obligation to pay them.31 
 
Having found that the Council had caused Altimarloch loss, the majority upheld the 
Court of Appeal’s award of $125,000 against the Council.  
 
2 Contribution  
 
Also at issue in the Supreme Court was the question of whether the vendors were entitled 
to contribution from the Council toward their liability to Altimarloch. Entitlement to 
contribution arises when the defendants are under a shared liability to the plaintiff.32 It 
follows from the principle that “persons who are under co-ordinate liabilities to make 
good the one loss must share the burden pro rata.”33 The reason for this is that, “he who 
takes the benefit must bear the burden.”34 Thus, an action for contribution will be 
entertained if the claimant has paid to the victim an amount that exceeds their fair share 
of the liability, or if the claimant’s liability has already been established and is more than 
the claimant’s fair share of the liability.35 
 
In the lower courts, the Council and the vendor conceded that contribution was available. 
  
30 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 1, at [69].  
31 At [69].  
32 Stephen Todd, John Burrows The Law of Torts in New Zealand (6th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2013) at 
[24.3.04].  
33 Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1969) 121 CLR 342 at 
350.  
34 Charles Mitchell, Paul Mitchell and Stephen Watterson, Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment 
(8th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2011) at [20-94].   
35 Joanne R. Morris Apportionment of Civil Liability: a discussion paper (Legal Research Foundation, 
Auckland, 1987) at 4.  
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In the High Court Wild J made a 50/50 apportionment on the basis that “equality is 
equity”.36 The council was required to pay $200,000 contribution to the vendor, a sum 
which represented half of the $400,000 common liability.37 This apportionment was 
undisturbed in the Court of Appeal.38 Taking into account the new level of damages, the 
Council’s contribution was set at $62,500.39  
 
In the Supreme Court a majority (Elias CJ, Blanchard J and Tipping J) held that 
contribution was not available. This was because the defendants’ liabilities were not “of 
the same nature and to the same extent”.40 The vendors were liable for failure to perform 
a promise inherent in a contractual term and were required to compensate the purchaser 
for the absence of the promised water rights ($1.05m). The Council was liable for the 
consequences of a negligent misstatement and thus required to compensate the plaintiff 
for the amount that it was worse off as a result of entering into the contract ($125,000).  
 
The practical consequence of this was that Altimarloch could enforce judgment against 
either or both defendants, but neither defendant was liable to contribute to the damages 
paid by the other defendant. Thus, if Altimarloch chose to enforce judgment against the 
vendor, the Council would pay nothing. Conversely, if Altimarloch chose to recover 
against the Council, the Council could not claim any amount from the vendor. It was this 
“unsatisfactory outcome” which prompted Tipping J’s call for legislative reform.41 
 
 
III  Damages in Contract and Tort  
A The principles  
 
  
36 Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd v Moorhouse (No 2), above n 5, at [61].  
37 At [63].  
38 Vining Realty Group Ltd v Moorhouse, above n 13, at [125].  
39 At [134].  
40 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 1, per Blanchard at [75], per 
Tipping at [146]-[147], per Elias at [57].  
41 At [152].  
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Contracts are about the mutual rendering of benefits.42 The general rule is that: 43 
 
…where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract he is, in so far as money 
can do it, to be placed in the same situation with respect to damages as if the contract had 
been performed. 
 
The compensatory aim of tort damages is different. In tort, the aim of an award of 
damages is to:44 
 
…put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he 
would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his or 
compensation or reparation. 
 
In contract, Altimarloch was entitled to be placed in the position it would have been in 
had the contract been performed. In tort, Altimarloch was to be restored to the position it 
would have occupied had there been no reliance on the misrepresentation.   
 
The apparent difficulty is that to award damages for both breach of a contract and for 
negligent misrepresentation involves putting the claimant in two places at once. The 
plaintiff obtains judgment to put it in the position it would be in if the contract had been 
performed and to compensate it for any detriment flowing from entry into the contract.  
 
 
B The approaches  
 
The majority accepted this result. Both the vendor and the Council had caused entry into 
the contract; the plaintiff had a separate cause of action against each. The plaintiff was 
therefore entitled to judgment against both defendants and entitled to recover against 
either, subject to not recovering more than its total loss.  
  
42 Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (18th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2009) at [2-002].  
43 Robinson v Harman (1848) 154 ER 363, [1843-60] All ER Rep 383 at 855.  
44 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 at 39.  
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The minority response was to make the plaintiff’s recovery from the Council dependent 
on the plaintiff’s likely recovery from the vendor. To do so they valued the plaintiff’s 
contractual claim against the vendor. The following sections will discuss whether this can 
be reconciled with the current law.  
 
 
IV  Calculation of Loss 
A Negligence 
 
The Council was potentially liable in negligence. To make out the cause of action, a 
plaintiff must prove damage. Loss or damage is the “gist” of the tort.45 As Lord Reading 
C.J said in J.R Munday Ltd v London C.C “[n]negligence alone does not give a cause of 
action, damage alone does not give a cause of action. The two must co-exist.”46 The 
damage suffered must be causally connected with the breach and recognised by law.47 
Furthermore, it must be within the scope of the duty owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff.48  
  
Causation in tort is typically split into two enquiries. Factual causation asks whether the 
loss or damage would have occurred “but for” the defendant’s negligence. A second 
enquiry into remoteness of damage is concerned with whether legal responsibility should 
be ascribed to the defendant’s conduct; if the damage is too remote from the defendant’s 
conduct, the defendant’s conduct will not have caused the damage in law.49 
 
  
45 Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465 at 474.  
46 J.R Munday Ltd v London C.C [1916] 2 KB 331 at 334.  
47 Christopher Walton, Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (12th ed, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters, 
London, 2010) at [1-34].  
48 South Australia Asset Management Corporation Respondents v York Montague Ltd. Appellants [1997] 
AC 191 (HL).  
49 JF Clerk, MA Jones, WHB Lindsell, A Dugdale (ed) Clerk & Lindsell on Torts ( 20th ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2010) at [2-01].  
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Three heads of damage are recognised as being actionable in negligence:  personal injury, 
physical damage, and economic loss. Where the loss claimed is economic, actual damage 
is suffered when the claimant is “financially worse off”.50  In Forster v Outred, financial 
loss was said to be:51 
 
…any detriment, liability or loss capable of assessment in money terms and it includes 
liabilities which may arise on a contingency, particularly a contingency over which the 
plaintiff has no control; things like loss of earning capacity, loss of a chance or bargain, 
loss of profit, losses incurred from onerous provisions or covenants in leases. 
 
B Measuring Loss/Damage  
 
In determining what loss has been caused by a defendant’s negligence the relevant 
comparison is between the plaintiff’s position had the defendant fulfilled its duty of care 
and the plaintiff’s actual position.52 Where the plaintiff has entered into a transaction as a 
result of the defendant’s negligence, the normal measure of the plaintiff’s loss is the value 
transferred, generally represented by the contract price, less the value received, whether 
of property or services or money.53 
 
In the present case, Altimarloch had paid $2.675 million for property worth $2.55 
million. The Supreme Court unanimously held that this represented a loss. However the 
minority held that this loss was only a prima facie loss; what had to be calculated was the 
purchaser’s ultimate position under the transaction. Altimarloch’s later claim for 
damages, arising out of the contract, was relevant in assessing the net loss suffered.  
 
An approach that takes into account the value of a subsequent claim for damages raises 
two issues of principle. The first is whether a subsequent event is relevant in assessing 
  
50 Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2) [1997] 1 WLR 1627 (HL) at 1639.  
51 Forster v Outred & Co [1982] 1 WLR 86 (CA) at 94 and 98.  
52 Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd, above n 50, at 1631. 
53 McGregor, above n 42, at [41-050].  
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loss arising out of the transaction. The second is whether a claim for damages can 
properly be treated as a benefit under that transaction.  
 
C Subsequent Events  
 
Ordinarily, loss resulting from a defendant’s negligence is calculated at the date of the 
breach.54 Where the defendant’s negligence induces entry into a contract, the relevant 
date is the date of entry into the contract. Applying the ordinary rule, the loss caused by 
the Council is the value transferred less the value received at the date of entry. That is, 
$2.675m – $2.55m = $125,000.  
 
However, the rule that loss is assessed at the date of the breach is not absolute; a number 
of cases have taken into account subsequent events. Courts have been willing to take into 
account subsequent events because of a belief that:55 
 
…damages are to be assessed in the real world. Compensation is a reward for real, not 
hypothetical loss. It is not to be made an occasion for recovery in respect of a loss which 
might have been, but has not been, suffered. 
 
In Kennedy v Van Emden56 the plaintiff paid a premium for the transfer of an under lease 
at a time when such premiums were unlawful. However, the law was then changed so that 
she could also sell the lease at a premium. The Court held that damages were to be 
assessed after the date of the law change and at that date the plaintiff could not be said to 
have suffered a loss.  
 
In McKinnon v e.Surv Ltd,57 Surveyors negligently failed to detect signs of possible 
movement in a property. At that time there were no means of telling whether movement 
  
54 Clerk, Jones, Lindsell, Dugdale, above n 49, at [10-144].  
55 Kennedy v Van Emden [1996] PNLR 409 at 23.  
56 Kennedy v Van Emden [1996] PNLR 409.  
57 McKinnon v E.Surv Ltd. [2003] EWHC 475, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep PN 174.  
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might actually be taking place. Later it emerged that the premises had in fact stabilised. 
The Court held that the later events were relevant in assessing, and hence reducing, the 
claimant’s damages.  
 
That the claim for damages in Altimarloch arises after the transaction is therefore not a 
bar to the claim being valued. However, it does indicate that some care should be 
exercised in determining whether to include the claim in the calculation. In the 
aforementioned cases, the event going to reduce the plaintiff’s loss had resulted in an 
actual reduction in loss at the time of judgment. It was not a situation where the court had 
to value the likelihood that the event would reduce the loss, as in Altimarloch.  
 
D The nature of what is taken into account  
 
No authority cited in Altimarloch directly addressed whether a claim for damages was 
relevant in assessing loss under a transaction. The minority thus relied on the case of 
Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2)
58
, a case in which a 
borrower’s covenant to repay a loan was valued for the purpose of assessing loss arising 
out of a loan transaction. One way of framing the issue in Altimarloch is therefore 
whether Nykredit should be applied to a claim for damages.  
 
1 Covenant to repay  
 
In Nykredit, the defendant surveyors had negligently overvalued a property, the security 
on which the plaintiff lenders had loaned money. Lord Nicholls said that, in one sense, 
the lender had suffered immediate detriment by paying money under the transaction, 
which it would not have done if properly advised.59 However, the lender might not suffer 
any actual loss at this point if there was no certainty that the borrower would default.60 In 
  
58 Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2), above n 50.  
59 At 1631.  
60 At 1631.  
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a case involving the negligent valuation of a loan security, the basic measure of loss 
called for a comparison between:61 
 
a) the amount of money lent by the plaintiff, which he would still have had in the absence 
of the loan transaction, plus interest at a proper rate; and  
b) the value of the rights acquired, namely the borrower’s covenant and the true value of 
the overvalued property  
 
In Nykredit, the borrower’s covenant to repay was worthless at the time of the lender’s 
entry into the transaction and the amount lent at all times exceeded the true value of the 
property. The comparison therefore showed a loss immediately upon entry into the 
transaction. However, if the borrower’s covenant had been valuable Lord Nicholls stated 
that “until default the lender may presently sustain no loss even though the security is 
worth less than the amount of the loan.”62 
 
2 Restitutionary rights  
 
The reasoning in Nykredit was applied to a restitutionary right by Rix LJ in Haugesund 
Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank.
63
 The case involved a swaps transaction entered into 
between Defpa Bank and Norwegian municipalities, which, contrary to the advice of 
Depfa Bank’s Norwegian solicitors, was ultra vires. The question in the case was whether 
Depfa Bank could recover the sum advanced from its solicitors. Or, as Rix LJ put it:64 
 
Is the solicitor liable to the bank for the whole of the sum transferred to the counterparty 
irrespective of every other consideration, save only to the extent that the bank succeeds in 
making an actual recovery from its counter party?”  
 
  
61 Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd (No 2), above n 50, at 1631.  
62 At 1632.  
63 Haugesund Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank [2011] EWCA Civ 33, [2011] 3 All ER 655.  
64 At [1]  
16  
Importantly for present purposes, Rix LJ in an obiter statement held that Depfa Bank had 
not suffered loss by entering into the transaction; in place of a contractual right to 
repayment Depfa had instantaneously obtained a restitutionary right against the 
Kommunes. Although Nykredit concerned a borrower’s covenant,65  
 
…there was nothing about the principles and the ‘basic comparison’ of which Lord 
Nicholls and Lord Hoffman spoke which in terms limited their approach to rights in 
contract, or rights in debt. They were addressing general principles. 
 
Thus, if a borrower’s covenant to repay was relevant in assessing a lender’s loss under a 
loan transaction, a restitutionary right to recover ought to be relevant in assessing Depfa 
Bank’s loss. Such a right which “rises up in place of the invalid contract is sufficiently 
close to the claim in contract, even thought its theoretical basis is totally different.”66  
 
3 The minority approach  
 
Tipping J saw their Lordship’s judgments in Nykredit as conveying a wider principle that 
was applicable in Altimarloch. Thus, Lord Nicholls’ statement that the plaintiff could not 
recover if the valuation “in practice” had caused no damage, and Lord Hoffman’s 
statement that the plaintiff could not recover if “on balance” he was in no worse a 
position, were taken to mean that “the contractual position between borrower and lender 
must be fully worked through before it can be said that the valuer’s negligence had 
caused any loss to the lender.”67 
 
Moreover, Tipping J and Elias CJ held that the subject matter of the cases could be 
treated in the same way. Elias considered that there was no distinction in principle  
  
65 Haugesund Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank, above n 63, at [51].  
66 At [72]. 
67 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 1, at [112].  
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between a claim for debt and a claim for damages; the only difference was in the 
difficulty of assessment.68 Tipping stated that:69  
 
When a third party’s negligence has induced the plaintiff’s entry into a contract, the 
question being addressed should not depend on the nature and incidents of the plaintiff’s 
cause of action under the contract. Rather, it should relate to the likelihood of recovery.  
 
 
4 Discussion  
 
The decision of the House of Lords in Nykredit, and that of Rix LJ in Haugesund show 
that it is possible to take into account rights under a contract, the monetary value of which 
is subject to change, and the quantification of which may be difficult. As Lord Nicholls 
states, “such difficulties as there may be are evidential and practical difficulties, not 
difficulties in principle.”70 
 
Furthermore, the approaches in Nykredit and Haugesund are concerned with closely 
identifying the actual loss suffered, a commendable goal. Thus, Clerk & Lindsell on Tort, 
commenting on Haugesund Kommune, favour Rix J’s approach on the basis that “[i]t 
should not be open to a party to construct a wholly artificial loss, merely by arguing that 
money lent, while repayable, is now recoverable on a technically different basis from that 
originally contemplated.”71 
 
However, there are differences between the situation in Nykredit and that in Altimarloch 
that indicate that caution should be exercised. First, Nykredit, involved a covenant to 
  
68 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 1, at [53].  
69 At [104]  
70 Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd, above n 50, at 1632.  
71 Michael A. Jones and Anthony M. Dugdale, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (20th ed. 2nd supplement, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2012) at [10-140].  
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repay a debt, not a claim for damages. In Eastgate v Lindsey Morden Longmore J said 
that there was an:72 
 
…essential difference between a claim for a repayment of a debt (to which there 
can ordinarily be no substantive defence and in respect of which a claimant does 
not have to prove loss) and a claim for damages for breach of contract (to which 
there may be many defences and in respect of which the claimant must prove his 
loss).  
 
Moreover, the Court in Nykredit was concerned with the question of when the cause of 
action accrued. The amount of the lender’s loss had previously been calculated based on a 
market valuation at the date of the negligent overvaluation.73 The Court was therefore 
valuing the borrower’s covenant in a situation where the borrower had in fact defaulted, 
and what was being determined was the moment in time when the borrowers covenant 
together with the property security, were inadequate.   
 
While it is possible to extend the decision in Nykredit to a claim for damages, it is not a 
logically necessary or easy step. Furthermore, as the following discussion indicates, to do 
so would be in tension with other principles of law.  
 
 
V   The Rule in The Liverpool (No 2)  
 
One such principle is the rule that a plaintiff need not recover compensation from third 
parties who, in addition to the defendant, are liable to it.74 This rule was glossed over by 
the Supreme Court.75 However, it is submitted that the rule is a significant reason why the 
minority approach should not be adopted.  
  
72 Eastgate Group v Lindsey Morden Group Inc [2002] 1 WLR 642 (CA) at 651.  
73 Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd, above n 50, at 1629. 
74 Steamship Enterprises of Panama Inc, The “Liverpool” (Owners) v “Ousel” (Owners), above n2.  
75 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 1, per Tipping at [108], per 
McGrath at [201].  
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A The principle  
 
In The Liverpool (No 2) the Ousel was sunk in the Port of Liverpool as a result of a 
collision with the Liverpool, whose owners admitted liability. The Harbour Board 
claimed against the owners of both vessels for the costs of clearing the wreck. The Board 
was statutorily entitled to £10,000 from the Ousel, and claimed against the Liverpool in 
negligence. The issue arose as to whether the Board was obliged to reduce its claim 
against the limitation fund of the Liverpool by giving credit for the £10,000 it was 
entitled to from the Ousel.  
 
Harman J, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said that the board did not:76  
 
Let it be conceded that the if the board had recovered the £10,000 from the Ousel under 
its statutory power that would have been satisfaction pro tanto of the damages; still the 
fact is that the board has not recovered this sum, and, in our judgment, there is no duty 
upon it to do so…this case, in our judgment, has nothing to do with the duty to mitigate 
damages. It concerns the board’s legal rights, and no duty rests on it at the demand of a 
tortfeasor to satisfy part of the damages by resorting to another tortfeasor; still less by 
resorting to an innocent party made liable merely by statute. 
 
While The Liverpool (No 2) concerned statutory and tortious rights of recovery, the 
principle is general.  In International Factors v Rodriguez77 the principle was applied in a 
situation where the defendant had converted cheques that had been assigned to the 
plaintiff factors. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had not suffered any damage 
because it retained a right to recover from the debtors. Sir David Cairns rejected this 
argument:78 
 
  
76 Steamship Enterprises of Panama Inc, The “Liverpool” (Owners) v “Ousel” (Owners), above n2, at 82-
3. 
77 International Factors Ltd v Rodriguez [1979] QB 351; 1 All ER 17, CA.  
78 At 359.  
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The position simply is that, assuming, as I will, that there is a right of action against the 
debtors, a plaintiff who has two causes of action cannot be met when he makes a claim 
against one defendant by the answer ‘Oh no; you’ve suffered nothing by my tort because 
you have a cause of action against someone else.’ That clearly cannot be right. 
 
 
B The anterior question of loss  
 
The rule in The Liverpool (No 2) provides that a plaintiff need not take steps to recover 
loss from parties who, in addition to the defendant, are liable to it. It follows that the right 
to recover against one defendant does not reduce the liability of another defendant in 
respect of the same damage.  Prima facie, this is inconsistent with an approach that takes 
into account the value of a potential damages claim in assessing loss caused by a 
tortfeasor.  
 
However, The Liverpool (No 2) was concerned with a state of affairs in which loss had 
already been determined. The principle is that rights against other third parties do not 
reduce the defendant’s existing liability. The logically anterior question is what that 
liability is. Tipping J disclaims any conflict with The Liverpool, stating that he is “not 
casting doubt on the ordinary rule that a plaintiff may choose whom to sue when more 
than one person is potentially liable. What is in issue here is whether one of those 
potentially liable parties has caused the plaintiff any loss.”79 
 
The inconsistency between The Liverpool (No 2) and an approach that values a claim for 
damages in assessing loss may therefore be overcome by conceptualising loss as an 
anterior question to the question of whom the claimant is entitled to recover that loss 
from. It is only when the tortfeasor can be said to have caused loss that they are liable in 
negligence. Until then, the rule in the Liverpool is not yet in play. This approach was 
adopted by Rix LJ in Haugesund Kommune. He said:80 
  
79 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 1, at [108].  
80 Haugesund Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank, above n 63, at [41].  
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In my judgment, the principle in The Liverpool (No 2) is not in doubt…However, all those 
cases proceed on the basis that the claimant’s loss has been established and what is at issue is 
whether the right to proceed for a remedy against another party can operate to reduce or 
remove the claimant’s right to judgment for his established loss against the defendant of his 
choice.  
 
This approach is open to criticism on the basis that while it is logically possible to treat 
the investigation into loss as separate from the investigation as to who the loss is 
recoverable from, where to draw the line may be contentious. Thus, the majority in 
Altimarloch considered that the tortfeasor had caused an immediate loss on the 
purchaser’s entry into the contract whereas the minority considered that loss should be 
assessed later, with reference to the contractual claim.  
 
A second criticism is that the approach offends an underlying rationale of the rule. This 
rationale is that a plaintiff is entitled to choose from which defendant it recovers 
compensation from.81 An approach which values the plaintiff’s contractual claim for 
damages in establishing the tortious loss, precludes this choice. To the extent that the 
claim against the contract breaker has been included in the tortious loss, that sum is only 
recoverable from the contract breaker.  
 
VI  Mitigation  
A Avoidable loss 
 
If Altimarloch had not sued the vendor, an issue may have arisen as to whether 
Altimarloch was required to do so in mitigation of its loss. A plaintiff must take all 
reasonable steps to mitigate its loss consequent on the breach, and cannot recover for any 
loss which it could have avoided but has failed, through unreasonable action or inaction, 
to avoid.82 The question of what amounts to reasonable mitigation is a question of fact. 83  
  
81 See Peters v East Midlands Strategic Health Authority [2009] EWCA Civ 145; [2009] 3 WLR 737 at 
[41].  
82 McGregor, above n 42, at [7-004]. 
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Three members of the Supreme Court raised this issue. Elias CJ noted that what is 
reasonable may include steps to recover all or part of the loss, though in some instances 
litigation against third parties may be more than is reasonable to expect.84 Blanchard J 
similarly observed that “[g]enerally a plaintiff is not required to take such a step in 
mitigation.”85 McGrath J would not have required litigation against the vendors. He said 
that “[t]here is no duty on the purchaser to mitigate its loss arising from the Council’s 
negligence by first suing the vendor for breach of contract by its misrepresentations.”86  
 
1 Third party litigation  
 
In Pilkington v Wood 87 it was said that “the so called duty to mitigate does not go so far 
as to oblige the injured party, even under an indemnity, to embark on a complicated and 
difficult piece of litigation against a third party”.88 The decision in Pilkington is accepted 
as laying down a general rule that complicated and difficult litigation will not be required 
in mitigation.89 However, McGregor on Damages states that:90 
 
…there is now a preparedness, appearing in professional negligence cases, for courts to 
see a failure to claim against a third party before suing the professional himself as a 
failure to mitigate.  
 
Thus, in  Western Trust Savings Ltd v Travers & Co 91 the court held that in an action 
against its solicitors the plaintiff lender had failed to mitigate its loss by not bringing an 
                                                                                                                                                 
83 Payzu v Saunders [1919] 2 KB 581 (CA) at 588 and 589.  
84 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 1, at [55].  
85 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 1, at [68].  
86 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 1, at [201].  
87 Pilkington v Wood [1953] Ch 770; [1953] All ER 810 (CHD).   
88 At [777].  
89 McGregor, above n 42, at [7-081]. 
90 At [7-083].  
91 Western Trust Savings Ltd v Clive Travers Co [1997] P.N.L.R. 295 (CA).  
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action for possession of the mortgaged property. In Walker v Medlicott & Son 92 a 
beneficiary under a will who sued the testator’s solicitors was held to have failed to 
mitigate by not first pursuing a claim for rectification of the will.  
 
In the writer’s opinion these cases should be seen as narrow exceptions to the general rule 
that litigation against a third party will not ordinarily be required. In Western Trust 
Savings Ltd v Travers the proposed litigation was “no more than a possession action 
which is an ordinary feature of enforcing security.”93 In Walker v Medlicott, the court was 
influenced by the fact that an un-rectified is anomalous in conferring a benefit on 
someone who was not intended to benefit. Further, rectification was seen as the obvious 
remedy.94 
 
It is unlikely that, had Altimarloch only sued the Council, litigation against the vendor 
would be viewed as a necessary step in mitigation. First, the litigation against the vendor 
would likely be complicated and difficult. Second, the situation in Altimarloch does not 
involve special factors like those in Travers or Medlicott. That litigation would probably 
not have been required is illustrated by the case of Cottingham v Attey Bower,95 in which 
claimants who sued their solicitors after purchasing defective house were not obliged to 
first sue the negligent surveyor, despite the surveyors being “on one view the most 
obvious defendant.” 96 
 
B Relationship with the normal measure of damages  
 
Despite it being unlikely that third party litigation would be required in mitigation, if it 
were, the value of litigation against the vendor would be deducted from the damages 
payable by the Council. This creates the potentially anomalous result that had 
  
92 Walker v Medlicott & Son [1999] 1 W.L.R 727 (CA).  
93 Western Trust Savings Ltd v Clive Travers Co, above n 91, at 303.  
94 At 742.  
95 Cottingham v Attey Bower & Jones ( A Firm ) [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 591.  
96 Cottingham v Attey Bower & Jones ( A Firm ) [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 591, at [29]  
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Altimarloch not sued the vendor, the principles of mitigation might have allowed a 
reduction in the damages payable by the Council but because they did sue, no reduction 
was permitted on the majority approach to calculation of loss.  
 
It is suggested that this is not a true anomaly. The enquiry into mitigation is a different 
enquiry from that into the loss suffered.97 Mitigation involves the court looking at what 
would have happened had the plaintiff taken the requisite steps in mitigation. The value 
of potential litigation can be taken into account because the purpose is to determine what 
amount of the loss was due to the plaintiff’s failure to take reasonable steps to avoid it. 
By contrast, valuing the likely recovery from the vendor for the purposes of calculating 
loss would involve the court looking to what will happen. This is conceptually quite 
different.  
 
The consequences of the two enquiries are also different. Where a plaintiff has suffered 
no loss the plaintiff has no cause of action in negligence. In contrast, where the plaintiff is 
found to have failed to mitigate to the extent of the whole of the primary loss suffered, 
the cause of action remains and the plaintiff may potentially recover for consequential 
loss.  
 
 
C Relationship with the Liverpool ( No 2) 
 
A tension exists between the rule in The Liverpool (No 2), and the cases in which 
litigation against a third party has been held to be reasonably necessary as a mitigating 
step.  
 
The rule in The Liverpool (No 2) exists independently of mitigation, and strictly speaking, 
operates in different circumstances. Thus, mitigation may require a plaintiff to take the 
  
97 Though mitigation may not be discussed separately, instead being incorporated into the normal measure 
of damages. See McGregor, above n 42, at [7-033].  
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step of litigating against a third party; the rule in The Liverpool (No 2) provides that a 
plaintiff need not take steps to recover from a party that is already liable to it. However, 
there is no doubt that the relationship is, as Tettenborn states, “awkward”.98 To this end, 
there is a suggestion that certain cases requiring third party litigation are  wrongly 
decided. Clerk & Lindsell on Torts states that:99 
 
It should be remembered that a claimant has an unfettered choice as to who he turns to, to 
make good his loss. From which it follows that a lawyer may be liable for a loss however 
reasonable it might be to expect the client to look to some third party instead for 
reparation. To this extent, the suggestion in Walker v Medlicott that it was the duty of a 
White v Jones claimant to take steps to recoup his loss by rectifying the will must now be 
regarded as very doubtful. 
 
To the extent that difficulties with regard to third party litigation already exist in the law, 
it is suggested that valuing a claim for damages at the calculation of loss stage would 
create more.  
 
 
VII The Cause of Action  
 
A  Contractual primacy  
 
Despite Tipping J’s statement that “[t]he reasoning which leads me to this conclusion is 
not based on any notion that contract has general primacy over tort”100, the effect of the 
minority judgment is that the contractual claim is placed in a special position. To value a 
contractual claim for damages in calculating a tortious loss necessarily involves taking 
into account the contractual claim first. This was recognised by McGrath J, who found 
that the effect, if not the intent, of Tipping J’s judgment was to give primacy to 
  
98 David Tettenborn and David Wilby The Law of Damages (2nd ed, LexisNexis, London, 2010) at [5.49].  
99 Clerk, Jones, Lindsell, Dugdale, above n 49, at [10-140].  
100 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 1, at [108]. 
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contract.101 Underlying the minority approach is the notion that the tortious cause of 
action should fill the gaps left by the contractual cause of action. The question is whether 
the nature of the contractual cause of action justifies this.  
 
B Is this justified? 
 
A contract is “a promise or set of promises which the law will enforce”102. Torts are civil 
wrongs, a “breach of a legal duty which affects the interests of an individual to a degree 
which the law regards as sufficient to allow that individual to complain on his or her own 
account rather than as a representative of society as a whole.”103  
 
Two main distinctions can be drawn between tort and contract.104 First, tortious duties are 
primarily fixed by law; contractual duties are based on the consent of parties. Second, tort 
duties are owed to persons generally (in rem); contractual duties are undertaken towards a 
specific person or persons (in personam).  
 
The first of these distinctions provides a possible justification for taking account of a 
contractual duty before a tortious one. Because contractual duties are consented to by 
parties, the law should give these duties primacy.  Thus, a concurrent duty of care in tort 
between contracting parties may be excluded if the contract expressly or impliedly 
excludes tortuous liability.105 This is justified on the basis that the law should uphold 
agreements consented to by the parties and prefer private ordering to imposed liability.  
 
  
101 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 1, at [206]. 
102 Frederick Pollock, Pollock’s Principles of Contract Law (13th ed, Stevens, London, 1950) at 1.  
103 Peter Birks “The Concept of a Civil Wrong” in David G. Owen Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law  
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995) at 51.   
104 Clerk, Jones, Lindsell, Dugdale, above n 49, at [1-03]. 
105 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145, [1994] 3 WLR 761.   
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However, the notion that “contract trumps tort”106 is not a general one, and it will do so 
“only in the right circumstances and between the right parties.”107 It is submitted that 
there is no reason why contract should be given primacy in this situation.  
 
First, Altimarloch does not involve concurrent liability. It is a situation where two 
different defendants have each induced entry into a contract. The tortious duty of care 
imposed on the Council in Altimarloch was not inconsistent with any contractual duty 
owed by the Council or by the vendor.  
 
A further objection is that both the representations made were in fact negligent 
misrepresentations. The vendor’s agents and the Council committed the same wrong. It 
was only by virtue of section 6 of the Contractual Remedies Act that the vendor’s 
misrepresentation was treated as a term of the contract. Indeed, s 6 does not constitute the 
misrepresentation a term of the contract, but treats the misrepresentation as if it were a 
term of the contract for the purposes of the remedy.108 Liability is not tortious, but it is 
not necessarily contractual either. There was thus no justification for giving the vendor’s 
claim primacy in Altimarloch.  
 
 
VIII  The preferable approach  
 
It is submitted that the majority approach should be preferred, as it is a more principled 
and practical approach to the issue.  
 
  
106 John G. Fleming “Tort in a Contractual Matrix” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall LJ 661 at 663 citing Peter Cane 
Tort Law and Economic Interests (Oxford, Clarendon, 1991).  
107 Jeffrey S. Leon and Shara N. Wright “Contract trumps tort, but which one comes up spades?” (2008) 34 
Advocates’ Q 475 at 475.  
108 See Francis Dawson and David McLauchlan The Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (Sweet & Maxwell, 
Auckland, 1981) at 12-13.  
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1 Both defendants’ acts were causes  
 
Both the Council’s misrepresentation and the vendor’s representation were factual causes 
of Altimarloch’s entry into the contract. If the Council had not been negligent 
Altimarloch would not have confirmed the contract and in the absence of the vendor’s 
agents misrepresentations the contract would not have been entered into at all. Both the 
defendants were therefore causes of Altimarloch being a party to a loss-making contract.  
 
2  No injustice in allowing judgment against both  
 
There is no injustice in allowing Altimarloch to obtain judgment against the Council 
without reference to the claim against the vendor. Both defendants have committed a 
wrong, and the plaintiff should be entitled to judgment against both. Altimarlcoh does not 
gain a windfall; once it has recovered the full amount of its loss, no further enforcement 
proceedings can be brought.  
 
That the plaintiff is entitled to enforce judgment against only one of the defendants may 
be perceived as being unfair to that defendant. But this is a consequence of the law 
preferring plaintiff compensation at the liability stage. Fairness between defendants 
should be worked out through a claim for contribution. While the availability of 
contribution between the defendants was also at issue in Altimarloch, it is suggested that 
the solution is for Parliament to reform the law of apportionment, rather than for Courts 
to devise rules that provide for a quasi-apportionment at the liability stage.  
 
3  Difficulties of principle 
 
Valuing a contractual claim for damages in assessing the loss caused by a tortfeasor is 
only tenuously supported by authority. Further, as shown above, the approach is in 
tension with the rule in The Liverpool (No 2). Where a proposed rule of law is difficult to 
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reconcile with the surrounding law, there should be a good reason to follow it. It is 
suggested that there is not sufficient justification in an Altimarloch fact situation.  
 
4  Practical Difficulties and Fairness   
 
Adopting the minority approach would require courts to value a contractual claim for 
damages where one exists.  Thus courts must first assess the likelihood that the plaintiff 
will obtain judgment against the contract-defendant, and second, the likelihood that the 
plaintiff will be able to enforce that judgment. The first assessment is made more difficult 
where the plaintiff sues the defendants in separate proceedings. The second could 
conceivably involve a complex investigation into the defendant or defendants’ solvency.  
 
Requiring courts to assess the value of a contractual damages claim will increase the 
length of proceedings and introduce an undesirable element of uncertainty into the 
calculation of loss. In Wardley Australia Ltd. v Western Australia109, the High Court of 
Australia rejected the proposition that contingent liabilities should be treated as loss. To 
do so:110 
 
would increase the possibility that the courts would be forced to estimate damages 
on the basis of likelihood or probability instead of assessing damages by reference 
to established events. In such a situation, there would be an ever-present risk of 
under compensation or over compensation.  
 
It is suggested that the same reasoning applies here. First, because the valuation exercise 
is inherently inaccurate, the plaintiff will over or under recover to the extent that the court 
gets the value of the contract claim wrong. Moreover, even where a court is able to 
accurately estimate the value of the damages claim, post-judgment events may render the 
defendant unable to pay. As Blanchard J notes, the Christchurch earthquakes demonstrate 
  
109 Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia [1992] 175 CLR 514.  
110 At 527.  
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that even defendants who are fully insured may find themselves without a full 
indemnity.111  
 
5 Still a loss suffered 
 
In some instances, the financial risk that a defendant may not pay will amount to “loss” 
for the purpose of a cause of action.  This is illustrated on the facts of Altimarloch.  
 
If Altimarloch had not entered into the transaction, it would still have $2.675m. As a 
result of entering into the transaction, it received property worth $2.55m and a claim for 
contract damages. However closely the court is able to calculate the value of the claim for 
damages, it can never be completely certain that the plaintiff will recover under the 
damages claim.  The chance of having money (however probable) can never be equal in 
value to actually having that money.  Therefore the value of the claim can never be 
equivalent to the plaintiff’s actual loss and the plaintiff is financially worse off at the time 
of judgment, even taking into account the claim for damages. The residual loss resulting 
from the uncertainty of recovery will in some cases amount to financial loss for the 
purpose of a cause of action.  
 
6 Contribution  
 
A further objection to the minority approach is that it significantly reduces the possibility 
that contribution will be available between defendants. First, in many cases, valuing the 
contractual claim will lead to a finding that the tortfeasor has caused no loss. In 
negligence without loss there can be no liability, and thus, no liability to contribute.  
Secondly, where the loss caused by the tortfeasor is premised on the likely recovery from 
a contract breaker, it will be very difficult to say that the loss caused by the tortfeasor is 
of the same extent as that caused by the contract defendant. 
  
111 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 1, at [72].  
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IX  Conclusion   
 
In Altimarloch, the Supreme Court grappled with a issue that, while narrow in scope, 
could only be resolved with reference to wider considerations of negligence and damages 
law.  
 
The majority approach to the issue was to allow the claim against the Council without 
reference to the contractual claim for damages. The minority saw the loss caused by the 
Council as dependant on the likely recovery under the contractual claim. To fit this into 
the legal framework, the minority valued the Altimarloch’s claim for damages against the 
vendor.  
 
An investigation into the principled basis of the minority judgment reveals that the law in 
some areas is in an awkward state, with tension between the rules in different areas. Thus, 
taking a claim for damages into account in valuing loss caused is in some senses 
inconsistent with the principle in The Liverpool (No 2). This principle in turn is in tension 
with decisions in which third party litigation has been held to be reasonable mitigation.  
 
Fortunately, the majority approach avoids most of this tension by not straying from 
established principles. Although on the facts of Altimarloch it may appear odd to say that 
the Council had caused loss, the majority approach is the correct one. Courts should be 
cognisant of the practical reality of situations and should take into account all relevant 
facts at the date of judgment. However, courts should not look to the future to determine 
present liability. To do so places the plaintiff at risk of under recovery and detrimentally 
impacts on the availability of contribution between defendants.  
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